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January 2006
The
Many Faces Of Liquidity
I Really Wanna Care.
I Wanna Feel Somethin’.
Let Me Dig A Little Deeper.
Nope, Nothin’. My
Give A Damn’s Busted…If there’s one issue that probably
all market participants, whether bull or bear, can agree upon,
it's
that the global economy and financial markets have been very big
beneficiaries of significant liquidity creation since the turn of
the millennium at the very least.
As we look back over the events of 2005 and ponder just how the
financial markets seem to have so easily shook off the real world
implications of crude above $60, natural gas prices in double
digits, the economic ramifications of the destruction left in the
paths of Katrina and Rita, the almost out of nowhere
bankruptcy of one of the largest futures trading outfits in the
country, and what appears to be the all but impending financial
implosion of the US auto industry, we can only come up with one
answer as to why - market participant perceptions of liquidity. We thought we’d kick off 2006 with a
bit of varied look at the
many faces of liquidity. After
all, we believe it’s undeniable that the greater force of
liquidity will continue to exert an important influence on the
markets in 2006, as it has really in a very meaningful manner
since the equity market lows of late 2002/early 2003.
Is there really going to be any hard driving conclusion to
this discussion? Not
really. What we hope
is important is to get a feel for the character of what we’re
dealing with in terms of how liquidity conditions can shape
economic and financial market outcomes, as well as try to develop
a sense of what to watch for in terms of ultimate change in the
nature of global liquidity somewhere ahead. After all, as Ray DeVoe opined many years ago, in the endgame
"liquidity is a coward, there's always too much when it's
least needed and it's nowhere to be found when needed the
most".
It also seems a bit
fitting to have a quick look at the greater concept of liquidity
now that we’re a month away from Bernanke assuming the position
of grand poobah at the Fed. As
you know, Bernanke is the academician who appears convinced that
the Holy Grail of real world financial and economic cycle
longevity is the L word itself – liquidity.
And more of it, baby.
In the much broader sense, we’re convinced that the
financial markets have very importantly convinced themselves over the past few
years that liquidity, per se, will always and everywhere be
available and will always and everywhere be low cost.
In fact, from a longer-term contrarian standpoint, this is
probably the most widespread and most important consensus viewpoint in the
financial markets of the moment. A viewpoint that we believe will ultimately be shattered.
But as always, the question is when and how? As you’d imagine, we only wish we had the answers to those
questions, as does everyone else.
Very quickly, we do have two guesses as to when and how. We believe the “shattering”, so to speak, will occur when
market expectations regarding the significant influence of
monetary inflation change. For
now, those expectations are completely benign; soothed by heavily
massaged government statistics that make current CPI numbers a
good bit incomparable with data from prior periods.
We believe gold is hinting directly at this issue, but it's only
the few that are listening for now. Secondly, we expect the shattering to at some point be
accompanied by the conceptual realization that ongoing liquidity
expansion equals
credit expansion. Liquidity
equals debt. As hard
as it may seem to comprehend, we’re not sure that has completely
sunk in to both the domestic and global financial markets in the
true sense. We’re
still living in the period where excess liquidity is a rush to the
brain, a new high, if you will.
We’ve just needed more and more of it in the current
cycle to continue the endorphin release or modification of the brain synapse
messaging function.
For now, it appears to us that the markets have convinced
themselves they have an infinitely renewable prescription courtesy
of the monetary physicians at the Fed.
And this is how we enter 2006.
One of the most important
aspects of excess liquidity is its influence on how we as a
greater investment community and global economy perceive risk.
Or more correctly, how those perceptions influence the
"price" of risk in a
multiplicity of asset values.
For example, in the world of the moment, we are seeing cap
rates (very simply rental cash flow relative to market values) on
real estate of all types, commercial and residential, literally at
the lows of our careers. We’ve
never seen anything like it.
It’s as if real estate investors are implicitly assuming
vacancy rates will trend toward zero in short order and rent
prices will exceed the general rate of inflation for many moons to
come with complicit tenants absolutely more than happy to pay ever
higher rental prices. In our eyes,
what global excess liquidity generation of the recent past has
done is to distort the traditional concept of market risk across
the broad spectrum of investment assets.
And when you get right down to the very heart and soul of
it, what is the very reason for being of an efficient
public/global financial marketplace other than to correctly price
in investment risk? Isn’t this
the very basis for the efficient market hypothesis? If not, then you can throw Bill Sharpe’s capital asset
pricing model in the nearest trashcan.
From our vantage point, what the Fed and their global
central bank compardes have done over the last half decade at
least is to create a financial market, and in part real economy,
whose traditional and very important sense of “give a damn”
is busted.
And we suggest this lack
of “give a damn” has only heightened over the last three
years. It’s not
just seen in real estate cap rates; we can see it very simply and
directly in generic fixed income risk premiums. Have a quick look at the following chart.

We already know that in
the world of today, yield spreads between many classes of fixed
income assets and risk free yields, that are supposedly exemplified
by US Treasuries, are tight. Very tight. A highly
levered fixed income market, a low overall rate of return
environment, and the significant growth of the hedge fund
community since 9/11 are key rationales as to why at the moment.
Above is a look at the relationship between the Moody's Baa yield
and the 10 year UST yield. In the immediate post 9/11
financial marketplace, yield spreads widened meaningfully over a
short number of months, prior to a subsequent bit of spread reversion on the back of
a Fed that acted to open the flood gates of monetary accommodation
in a split second. We already know that at the market lows
of late 2002-early 2003, many a yield spread hit their apex in
what was a market pricing in meaningful real world investment risk. But the Fed
and Administration really swung into action in 2003 and brought
the definition of accommodation to a whole new level. Being
quick learners, market participants from that point forward
finally figured out that anything deleterious to the US economy
for even a brief period would be accommodated away by the Fed and
Administration. Hence, yield spreads collapsed from late
2002 straight through to the present. Moreover, and as you
can see, financial market participants in 2005 have clearly
learned to simply not "give a damn" in the wake events such as
the significant GM and Ford financial deterioration (or the
realization of just how big the problems really are), accounting
scandals at FRE and FNM, Katrina, Rita and REFCO, as well a
meaningful upward change in the commodity and energy markets . Lesson well
learned about the Fed and liquidity? It sure looks that way.
For now, in the wake of what should have been eye-opening and
market moving events in 2005, the risk premium being assigned in
the example above is virtually non-existent.
It just confirms our thought that the markets are more than
knee-deep in discounting the characteristics of modern day
liquidity (continual availability and cheap cost) well into
the future, more so than perhaps at
any time in the current cycle. As we said above, this is how we enter 2006.
As a quick tangent to the
timing in yield spread compression seen in the chart above, you
can see below that the VIX also began its own most recent multi
year collapse in late 2002, completely in directional coincidence
with bond yield spreads seen in the example above. We included the top part of the
chart more as an FYI than not. It compares the price level
of the SPX with the VIX over the last decade and one half.
As you can see, we're now well above the peak put in during
2000. In our eyes, this is a statement on price relative to
risk. Or should we more properly characterize the current
environment as "what risk in light of an implicit liquidity
promise?"

By no means are tiny real
estate cap rates, traditionally risky versus risk free bond
yield spreads being very tight, and the VIX relative to the
S&P exhaustive examples of current financial market
complacency regarding financial/economic risk. But we
believe they are meaningful visual representations of a market
that is basically saying, "I don't give a damn because I
don’t have to. I
have Alan and, even better, will soon have Ben".
Reflective of a market that has learned not to give a damn in the
wake of events potentially dangerous and significantly disruptive
to the real US economy. A market that has learned to place
implicit faith in the Fed to heal all financial wounds, if not
necessarily real world economic wounds. We'll be continuing
to watch our little versions of financial market risk premium
assignment as we move forward for signs of change. A market that
might lose faith in the Fed or Administration will price in that
loss of new age religion by assigning heightened financial asset
risk premiums across the financial market scoreboard. What we're
discussing above is simply a
representation of what we believe the markets currently expect, translated into price
and risk premium experience of the here and now. From our standpoint, good to
know as we enter the new year. Market participants have a
definite sense of risk invincibility. If the market gets what it expects it terms of forward
liquidity accommodation, then the current price discounting has
been correct. If it does not get what it expects, then we
would suggest a price adjustment lies in our future. And
perhaps a meaningful adjustment given the more than noticeable lack of risk premium
currently embedded in many a financial asset price.
Given that global capital flows, now more than ever, act to set
financial asset prices across the planet, it's global capital's
reaction to how liquidity conditions are influenced by the
domestic monetary authorities that may be the most important watch
point of all as we move forward.
"history
has not dealt kindly with the aftermath of protracted periods of
low risk premiums"
Of course Greenspan's above comment regarding risk
premiums delivered at Jackson Hole last year is completely disingenuous in
that the Fed has been the key provocateur in helping to remove
risk premiums among major financial asset classes really since the
aftermath of the 9/11 tragedy. We at least would have
expected some type of reaction in intermarket price relationships in US
financial markets in the wake of GM/Ford, FNM, FRE, Katrina, Rita
and REFCO but so far - nothin'. And in reality, as you know, we have no one but
the Fed to thank for that.
As a final comment, we've not discussed our view of risk premiums to necessarily suggest the
markets are wrong. They're never wrong. Rather, we
thought it useful to bring this up in terms of maintaining our own
sense of awareness and our own comfort level with the investment risk we wish to
accept in the financial marketplace set against how we perceive
the market to be pricing in risk at the moment. The lack of heightened
financial asset risk premiums in the wake of 2005 events we
mentioned isn't something terrible, it is what it is. But
from our standpoint, we believe that the important point is if the
markets are pricing in very little forward "risk"
relative to historical precedent, we need to adjust for that in
our own investment and hedge related actions. We
just need to realize that the markets are currently giving
themselves very little price cushion in case real events looking
ahead unfold somehow less than very favorable to the US economy.
Alternatively, maybe we can suggest that the markets are
moving into 2006 never more assured, as seems Bernanke, that
excess liquidity indeed is the Holy Grail. Onward to
Camelot?
The World I Love, The
Tears I Drop, To Be Part Of The Wave, Can’t Stop.
Do You Ever Wonder If It’s All For You?…Let’s
leave the philosophical for a bit and look at the faces of
liquidity we see in the real world. In the two tables below
we’re looking at two faces of liquidity – total credit market
debt and M3. The
credit market numbers are taken from the most recent 3Q Fed Flow
of Funds report. In
our minds, quite simply, these tables show us accelerating real
world economic dependence on increasing liquidity availability and
the real economy increasingly drawing on that liquidity over time.
What’s a bit interesting is that in the current decade so
far, we’ve about matched nominal dollar GDP growth for the
entire decade of the 1980’s, but growth in total credit market
debt so far into the current decade’s journey is already close
to 60% greater than was the case for the entirety of the 1980’s.
Bringing it down to per dollar numbers makes the point.
Does this set of data tell us that we’ve needed an
extraordinary amount of liquidity/debt growth to achieve what has
really been one of the weakest economic recoveries of any cycle of
the last half-century at least?
If that’s not the conclusion, then what do these numbers
tell us?
| US
GDP And Total Credit Market Debt ($Billions) |
| Decade |
Increase
In GDP |
Increase
In Total Credit Market Debt Outstanding |
Dollars
Of Credit Market Debt Growth For Each New Dollar Of GDP
Growth |
| |
| 1950's |
$161.9 |
$286.5 |
$1.77 |
| 1960's |
491.4 |
752.2 |
1.53 |
| 1970's |
1,655.9 |
2,791.4 |
1.69 |
| 1980's |
2,923.8 |
8,544.1 |
2.92 |
| 1990's |
3,935.2 |
12,379.0 |
3.15 |
| 2000's |
3,081.5 |
13,623.5 |
4.42 |
We
really see the same set of dynamics when looking at money supply
growth (M3 being the broad proxy) relative to the real economy.
Nominal dollar M3 growth over the last six years has no
precedent in US history, not that this is a big surprise. But,
again, when we bring this down to per dollar values and compare
this relative to GDP growth across the prior decades, the striking character of the
current cycle stands out like a sore thumb.
| US
GDP And M3 ($billions) |
| Decade |
M3
Growth |
Increase
In GDP |
Growth
In M3 For Every Dollar Of GDP Growth |
| |
| 1960's |
$316.3 |
$491.4 |
$
0.64 |
| 1970's |
1,192.8 |
1,655.9 |
0.72 |
| 1980's |
2,268.2 |
2,923.8 |
0.76 |
| 1990's |
2,474.7 |
3,935.2 |
0.63 |
| 2000's |
3,547.0 |
3,081.5 |
1.15 |
Without
trying to sound melodramatic or wildly over the top, but simply
factual in looking at the real numbers you see above, do we have a
current economy that certainly appears a bit addicted to cheap and easily available liquidity?
Sure we do. It’s
no wonder the markets have come to expect more of the same, as the
alternative seems unthinkable at this point.
And the Fed up to this point has done absolutely nothing to
discourage this viewpoint. In fact, we probably have the
ultimate cheerleader for this construct picking up the baton on
February 1st. At least in terms of financial risk premiums we discussed
above, the market is clearly ignoring or assigning a zero
probability to “the alternative”, so to speak.
Again, we see this as the most important financial market
macro consensus viewpoint of the moment which to monitor for
change, real world as well as psychological, as we move forward
into 2006.
Hedging Our Bets...To
ourselves, what the essence of the discussion up to this point
would suggest is that making use of investment risk hedges in the
current environment is probably a pretty smart thing to do, if not
mandatory, especially given that the market sure does not seem to be
implicitly doing this for us in so many asset price examples of the
moment. Give up a little something on the upside to
essentially do what the market should be doing in terms of risk
protection vis-à-vis current asset pricing. But we want to end this discussion with a
another look at hedging, so to speak. And that's with a
quick and overview review of the hedge and proprietary trading
communities. Why is this important? We're convinced
that the asset growth in both the hedge community and among the proprietary trading
desks is responsible for a number of important changes in the
texture and character of the financial markets over the last half decade at
least. And not that this is bad by any means. It
simply is what it is. Our simple belief is that we need to
stay on top of the magnitude of these changes in order to better
understand the environment in which we work. Same deal as
trying to remain aware of the dynamics of liquidity. We need
to know both our teammates and opponents on the playing field at
all times. And the
reason we home in on the hedge and proprietary trading desks is
that it's these folks specifically who make the most use of
financial market liquidity/credit availability, to which we've been
referring, on a daily basis in the
markets. Clearly, in our minds, the hedge crowd has helped
to accelerate individual sector price volatility and magnitude of
shorter term sector movements over the last half decade, despite
the apparent quiescence of the macro world of equity risk premiums
according to the VIX.
As we've mentioned to you many a time, when short term equity
rallies have lifted off since the equity market bottom in late
2002/early 2003, beta has led the charge. We attribute this
phenomenon to both the hedge players and momentum players closely
following in their footsteps. Hoping for a fast bang for the
buck is what we've seen at the outset of virtually all of these
short term rallies. Likewise on sell offs, damage has been
short and sharp as of late. The homebuilders and energy
sectors felt the swift wrath of the selling swords aplenty in
September and October of last year. We could go on and on with example
after example of sharp and fast sector movements, but you get the
picture.
As of the end of 3Q of last year, it's estimated that the hedge community has grown to just
shy of $1.1 trillion in total assets under management. It's
just about a doubling since year end 2001 and a quadrupling since
1996.

But what is
also clear is the fact that year over year growth in hedge asset
accumulation has been slowing in recent years and we believe
it's for obvious performance reasons, or lack thereof to be more
specific. Secondly, institutional money has also
"found" private equity funds in ever greater fashion
over the recent past. As you know, the large pension funds
in this country had been loaded with large cap blue chips over
time. The exact sector that has been one of the most
significant laggards over the past half decade. Large institutional
pension dough is chasing hedge and private equity investments out
of sheer lack of alternative rate of return terror. But this is
important in that the private equity players are also big users of
liquidity/leverage. That's how the whole private equity game makes sense,
to be honest. So what you see below is not wildly
surprising, because the decline in rate of change in hedge asset
growth has largely transferred
to the acceleration in private equity assets under
"management".

Finally, just
for a bit of perspective, what do hedge assets look like against
some type of a macro benchmark? Below is a look at hedge assets as
a percentage of the market value of US equities in their entirety.
(We obtained the market value data from the Fed Flow of Funds
report estimate for total market value of US equities at each
calendar interval.) Now clearly not all hedge outfits are
playing the stock game. There's plenty of fixed income,
derivative, off shore, etc. assets and vehicles being used.
What you see below is just our trying to get a sense for
magnitude.

Giving
Props To The NYSE Member Firms...Although
it's clear that the hedge community is helping to change the face
of the financial markets as we know them today, perhaps not enough
folks give proper respect to what many of the NYSE member firms
are up to these days. As you might know, proprietary trading
has become a very big deal for many of the NYSE members. And
although the specialist firms are members and do trade for their
own accounts, we're really talking here about the Merrill's, Goldman's,
JP Morgan's, etc. of this world. NYSE "members"
with access to some serious capital/liquidity availability. According to
the wonderful folks at the NYSE, member firm proprietary trading
now makes up over 20% of total trading volume on the Big Board.
As you can see below, this is up from less than 5% five short years ago.
To suggest that the large brokerage outfits have expanded their
proprietary trading desk activities is an understatement.
Combine these stats with the hedge fund proliferation data and you
are looking at the ingredients as to why daily trading activity in
the equity markets today has a much different focus and character than it did
even five short years ago. And knowing that these players
are some of the most prolific in terms of the application of
liquidity/credit in leveraged financial investment/speculation, we
think it's important to both realize and keep tabs on what's going
on in this neck of the financial market woods.

One final
look at structural market change over which to ponder. It's
simply an update of a picture we have shown you in the past.
It's the picture of program trading as a percentage of weekly NYSE
volume. From near 20% five years back, we're now looking at
roughly 55% of weekly NYSE weekly volume being driven by program
trading. Again, neither good nor bad. It's not just a
sign of the times and a sign of the changed nature of market
players and focus, which is clearly exemplified by the growth of
the hedge and prop desk communities, but what you see below is
certainly a function of ongoing technological change and the ever
increasing concentration of investment assets in large
institutions. Again, this is not something evil, but a
fact that acts to meaningfully shape the nature of the current
financial markets. Especially over the short term.

As you know, all of the above
data paints a picture of very important change in terms of the
character of market participants of the moment. You know
that both the hedge and prop desk communities are focused on the
short term. Intensely focused short term. For them,
this is much more a game of short term speculation as opposed to
long term investment positioning. Together they command a
meaningful portion of shorter term actual market activity than
literally ever before. As opposed to pining for the
"good old days", so to speak, we need to incorporate
this information into our own thinking and attempt to use it to
our own advantage. One last comment we'll make is that much
of the above data would lead us to believe that market volatility,
all else being equal, would be much greater with a thriving hedge
and prop desk community than not. But, as you know, we see
popular measures of volatility such as the VIX and VXN much nearer
historic lows than not. From our point of view, just maybe
the VIX and VXN are low because of the intensity of short
term focus of these two powerful forces, hedge and prop desk trading.
If you will, the excessive competition for short term basis point
rate of return is keeping arbitrage opportunities to a bare
minimum and macro environment excess liquidity is killing what
have been historic financial asset risk premiums embedded in
price.
And even though sector volatility is higher than not in our view
of life, money sloshing between sectors as opposed to the macro tradeoff
of cash versus stock exposure, has kept overall major index price
volatility low. In other words, we see less money
"leaving the market" as opposed to simply shifting
emphasis in an ever more furious fashion short term.
What can we learn from all of
this? We have just a few thoughts. And maybe we're
really talking to ourselves more than not. First, we need to
continue learning to use sector or individual security specific
volatility to our own advantage over the short term, when longer
term fundamental convictions regarding those sectors or securities
are firmly grounded. Secondly, although we believe the
marriage of fundamental and technical analysis is very important
for any investor to incorporate into decision making over time,
from a short term perspective, technicals and quant models are
driving a big piece of prop desk trading as well as many hedge
management styles. Again, it simply is what it is. We find
ourselves watching charts more and more these days. If
nothing else, timing the entry and exit of positions is clearly a
multidisciplinary process. As you know, we're just
scratching the surface in terms of what these changes you see
described above mean for the total of the investment community
longer term. We just hope that being attuned to the structural
change we currently see is conquering half the battle in terms of
ongoing awareness of our total surroundings, so to speak. And finally, not only is the
concept and reality of market perceptions of liquidity important in
terms of trying to get a sense for current consensus thinking and action,
and where that thinking may at some point encounter its proverbial
Achilles Heel, but is crucially important in terms of how liquidity
and leverage affect the current movers of the markets on a very
short term basis at the margin - the hedge and prop desk communities,
and to a much lesser extent the private
equity funds. Stepping back and looking at the broad macro
of market liquidity and the increasing influence of the hedge and
prop desk communities on the financial markets short term, we need
to realize that there is a true symbiotic relationship between the
Fed (as well as the Bank Of Japan and People's Bank Of China) and
the hedge/prop desk crowd at the moment. It's a story of the
relationship between the provocateurs of excess liquidity and how
that liquidity finds its way into financial asset prices. In one sense, the character and texture of the
current financial market, and the real economy, really is
different this time. But, let's face it, isn't it really
different every time, so to speak? We sure think so.
We hope that by being very aware of our total surroundings, we
won't get lost. This is how we
enter 2006.
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