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December 2004
The
Containment Area
Wishing Wells...As you know, according to
the Fed, inflationary pressures remain “well contained”.
According to many a Street strategist and many of the
favored blue chip economists, domestic inflationary pressures
remain “well contained”.
Unfortunately, if you dig behind the headlines of a number
of economic stats of the moment, inflationary pressures don’t
appear to remain well contained at all.
In fact, one of the rationales China gave for raising rates
a few weeks back is that inflationary pressures are rising in the
country.
It's clearly evident.
Of course, that’s just their problem, right?
We want to explore some current data regarding
inflationary pressures. Clearly the potential for shifting
inflationary expectations over time has direct implications for
fixed income investments moving forward. Implications for
the general level of interest rates within the context of a highly
levered economy. Early next year, we plan on devoting at
least an entire subscriber discussion to investment themes we
believe will be important as we move into 2005. As you'd
expect, this will involve discussion regarding the dollar, the
rate of change in profit growth and profit margins, etc. But
what we believe will clearly be one of the important themes as we
move into the new year will be the juxtaposition between currently
quiescent inflation perceptions or expectations, as fostered and
encouraged by such luminaries as the Fed members, and the ultimate
reality of the numbers that are to unfold. In the following
set of charts and commentary, we want to explore a bit deeper the
actual numbers that are now available in the public domain
relating to the current reality of what we consider to be
heightened inflationary pressures. We know folks like Bill
Gross are yakking about hedonic adjustments. In fact, as you
probably know, Kurt Richebacher brought the subject of hedonic
adjustments in CPI data to light a half decade back. Is it a
real and important issue? You bet it is. But it's not
new news. Although the mainstream largely chooses to ignore
the issue of hedonic price adjustments and manipulation, it's not
an undiscovered phenomenon by any means. OK, fine.
Rather than ranting about the anti-inflationary illusion borne of
hedonic adjustments in the public inflation data, we'll simply use
the actually reported data itself in looking for the birthplace
and breeding ground of real economy inflationary pressures.
Because as the facts now stand, hedonic adjustments or not, the
drumbeats of heightened inflationary pressures are rumbling.
Can you hear them?
The
Containment Area...We'll try to move through the graphs and
commentary quickly. We believe that what you see below is
quite suggestive of inflationary pressures building as we
speak. Quite simply, we only need to look just below the
headlines to find them. In terms of the financial markets,
what is most important to us is the real potential for shifting
perceptions and changing expectations regarding inflation as we
move into the new year. For as you know, these are the swing factors that can and do
influence financial asset prices in a meaningful manner over
time. Let's get right to the anecdotes of building
inflationary pressures as we see them.
PPI
Intermediate Materials Index
As you most likely remember,
the unexpected and well above consensus 1.7% PPI headline number
recently reported for October, which of course annualizes at
20.4%, was simply dismissed as being totally related to food and
energy. Mere bothers
more than anything else, right?
Although we have not brought up the subject for many a
moon, we always check in on the PPI intermediate materials
subcomponent of the report. It
gives us a good feel for what domestic businesses are experiencing
in terms of real input cost pressures.
The types of pressures that China is apparently directly
experiencing at the moment. The year over year rate of change in PPI intermediate
materials came in at 9%. It’s
the largest year over year growth rate number since 1981!!!

Maybe more importantly, we believe it is quite
illuminating to compare the year over year rate of change in PPI
intermediate materials prices with the year over year rate of
change in finished goods pricing.
In essence, this directly gives us a feeling for margin
pressures at the corporate level.
The rise in input costs versus the rise in finished goods
pricing ability. Below
is the year over year rate of change differential between
intermediate materials and finished goods prices.
As you can see, this ratio currently rests at a quarter
century+ high. As you
can also see, these peak experiences directly preceded every
recession of the last two and one half decades, with the exception
of the 1994/1995 experience (the real acceleration period in the
current credit cycle).

If
this isn't direct inflationary pressure resulting in forward
profit margin maintenance questions at the corporate level, then
what is it? Of course one saving grace for domestic
corporations currently is that the growth in labor costs remains
very low. That’s a
help to offset what you see above.
Crazily
enough, even the sacred “core rate” of PPI change rose 7.8%
year over year in October – the greatest annual increase since
1995. The consensus
apparently blew off the very inflationary implications of this
report due solely to the recent retreat in crude prices.
Unfortunately, from a much longer term standpoint, the
recent back off in crude might someday look like a blip on the
chart. Even the CPI
report of a few weeks back showed us that the gap has now widened
further between the year over year rate of change in headline CPI
inflation relative to the year over year rate of change in
domestic US wage growth. In
essence, real wage growth just sunk deeper into negative
territory, but of course that's only for those workers who
actually consume food or use some type of energy resource.
No worries, right?
Philly Fed Future Prices Received
As
you know, each month we are treated to the Philly Fed Index.
Basically it's a read on business conditions in the greater Philly
area as provided to us by our friends at the Philly Fed. One
component of the survey is what businesses believe will be their
ability to receive higher prices for their products in future
periods. From our standpoint, it's important because it says
something about expectations. Point blank, the current
respondents to this survey expect to receive higher prices ahead.
As of November, the Philly Fed future prices received component of
the report rests at a 15 year high not seen since 1989.
Perhaps this is a reflection of blind optimism on the part of
business executives. Or perhaps not. As we mentioned
above, the current spread between the annual rate of change in PPI
intermediate materials prices and PPI finished goods prices is as
wide as anything seen over the last few decades. Cutting
right to the bottom line, these PPI price relationships suggest
profit margins are being squeezed. From the standpoint of
simplistic common sense, a natural response on the part of
businesses would be to raise prices of final goods. Is this
why the following chart looks like it does? Are survey
respondents really expecting higher prices for their products out
of a current margin squeeze necessity? Sounds pretty darn
logical to us.
As
you can see below, this data goes back three and one half decades.
Expectations regarding future prices received trended up from 1968
to 1980, interrupted temporarily only by the mid-1970's recession.
These expectations of higher future prices followed real world
inflationary increases like clockwork. But from 1980 until
close to 2000, this price expectations survey dropped in cyclical
fashion along the longer term two decade secular trend. It
matches up literally perfectly with the 1970's real cycle of
inflation and the 1980 to end of century disinflation period.
Lastly, as is crystal clear, this index has again trended up in
meaningful fashion over the last few years. Are the Philly
Fed respondents telegraphing us a message of higher prices (higher
nominal prices and inflationary pressures) ahead? It sure as
heck looks that way. As you know, this is response from the
front lines of business experience as opposed to some assumption
from either a Fed member or Wall Street "blue chip"
economist, both of which do not sit on the front lines the last
time we checked.

The Relationship Between Nominal GDP And Interest Rates
As
you know, one of the ongoing questions when assessing Fed monetary
policy at any point in time is whether these folks are
"behind the curve" or "ahead of the curve" in
terms of monitoring and forestalling inflationary pressure.
Have interest rates been kept too low in a rising inflationary
environment, in essence a circumstance in which the Fed is
"behind the inflation curve"? Or is the Fed too
far out in front of inflationary trends by having raised interest
rates too much in any cycle, choking off economic expansion
perhaps prematurely? Clearly, these questions can always
find absolutely perfect and correct answers in hindsight.
But the financial markets deal in foresight and anticipation.
Hence, we need to look at historical precedent in an attempt to
try to anticipate a number of scenarios which might unfold ahead vis-à-vis
coincident inflationary pressures and Fed policy at any point in
time.
Let's
start with the simple relationship between changes in nominal GDP
and interest rates. Historically, there has been a decent
directional correlation between annual changes in nominal GDP and
interest rates. In this case, we're using the 10 year
Treasury yield as a proxy for interest rates in general. As
you can see, from 1968 through 1980, the annual rate of change in
GDP was quite strong, pushing well into double digit territory by
the late 1970's. Was this simply bang up economic growth?
Or was it more of a reflection of significantly rising inflation
that was translating directly into rising nominal prices, creating
the illusion of real growth? Again, in hindsight, it's
pretty easy to see that it was the latter. Inflation was
influencing inventory values, etc. So despite fantastic
nominal GDP growth, the equity markets pretty much went nowhere
point to point during this period because they knew that the
nominal growth was illusory in terms of the ultimate translation
into real growth. It was being driven by inflation.
Simultaneously, the Fed was behind the curve, so to speak, in the
1970's. They were always trying to catch up to almost
continually rising prices in terms of setting monetary policy.
It is clear that the year over year change in nominal GDP from
1968 to 1980 outstripped the 10 year Treasury yield by a mile.
The breeding ground for rising inflationary pressures.

Alternatively,
from 1980 until the late 1990's, the year over year change in
nominal GDP almost mirrored the ten year Treasury yield.
Let's face it, in the early part of that period, the Fed was an
avowed inflation fighter. Then Fed head Paul Volcker
administered interest rate shock therapy to an economy where
rising inflation expectations had become the rule, not the
exception. Bold central banking policy of Volcker ushered in
nearly two decades of disinflationary trends in the US economy.
As you can see, despite the disparate percentage increase markers
on each side of the graph above, it has really been in the last
two to three years that the year over year change in nominal GDP
has once again moved out well ahead of 10 year Treasury yields.
It's suggestive of a Fed behind the proverbial inflationary
pressure curve.
To
try to graphically simplify this a bit, the following chart is
literally the difference between the 10 year Treasury yield and
the year over year rate of change in nominal GDP. For us, in
simple form this is a gauge of whether the Fed is ahead of the
curve, so to speak, or behind it. Negative territory tells
us that the nominal level of interest rates is not keeping pace
with nominal changes in GDP. Nominal changes in GDP, of
course, at least in part being influenced by general inflationary
pressures. Over the last few years, we're seeing an
occurrence that is not wildly unlike the experience of the early
1970's.

Does
what you see above absolutely guarantee that inflation is about to
make a dramatic and sudden appearance in the current environment?
What the current set of relationships suggest to us is that we've
entered the breeding ground for potentially meaningfully rising
inflationary pressures over time. As was the case in the
late 1960's and early 1970's. We believe that the longer
this relationship remains in negative territory, the better the
chance that rising inflationary pressures will express themselves
in the headlines. As we mentioned, we continue to see
characterizations of domestic inflation as "contained".
From the Fed to the Street guru's, this has become the mantra.
But what is really most important looking ahead is whether this is
truly consensus thinking. Looking at the general level of
current interest rates, we have to believe it's very close to
consensus thought that has been impounded in current prices.
If this perception of contained inflation is questioned ahead for
any reason, we can't see how that would be a good thing for
interest rate markets and fixed income prices, to say nothing of
the spill over influence of higher interest rates on the real
economy.
Measures Of CPI
As
we mentioned, let's forget the influence of hedonic adjustments
for a moment. Let's just have a look at actually reported
CPI data in the current environment. Moreover, let's even
briefly push aside the headline measure of CPI and have a look at
the sacred and almighty "core" CPI reading. What
you see below is the relationship between the year over year
change in core CPI and the coincident period Fed Funds rate.
It's clear that there have only been two periods in the last 15
years at least were these two measures have met up in percentage
terms, so to speak. Late 1992 through 1993 and the period
from late 2001 until the present. As you already know, both
of these periods can be characterized as being instances of
extreme and extraordinary monetary accommodation. From 1994
through late 2001, the Fed Funds rate was on average 250-300+
basis points higher than the year over year change in the
"core" CPI rate. This is exactly where this spread
went post the 1993 bank bailout accommodation period. Are we
about to see the current Fed Funds rate leap 250-300+ basis points
ahead of an already rising core CPI rate ahead? We'd be
talking about a 5-6.5% Fed Funds rate if that is to be the case.
We have a very hard time seeing just how that can happen in the
current environment without a meaningful financial blow up or two
(or more) along the way. As you know, the total US economy
is much more levered to a change in interest rates today than was
the case in 1993.
Once
again, this is a picture which can give us a sense of whether the
Fed is ahead of or behind the curve in terms of addressing forward
inflationary pressures in the system. As with the
characterization of the relationship between interest rates and
nominal GDP growth above, the picture below shows us the breeding
ground for forward inflationary pressures. Plain and simple.
Unless the world is about to come to an end, it sure looks like
the Fed is behind the curve to us.

As
you can see above, the last time the year over year core rate of
CPI change was where it stands today, the Fed Funds rate was over
5%. As a quick definition, the core CPI measure we used
above is simply headline CPI devoid of the influence of food and
energy prices. After all, everybody and their brother knows
that any inflationary pressures relating to energy are temporary,
right? After all, part time petro geologist Greenspan has
assured us this is to be the case. But incredibly enough, as
we take the reported CPI numbers apart a bit, we actually see that
while headline CPI pressures have been building over the last
quarter, the rate of change in rising food and energy prices has
been subsiding. Meaning? Prices exclusive of food and
energy have been rising, no question about it. And despite
the hedonic adjusting, it's showing up in the numbers. Just
have a look.
| Consumer
Price Index Components (annualized through 10/04) |
| Component |
3
Months |
6
Months |
1
Year |
| |
| Headline
CPI |
3.21% |
3.11% |
3.19% |
| |
| Food |
2.59 |
3.82 |
3.40 |
| Energy |
14.84 |
18.79 |
15.24 |
The
rate of change of the rate of change in headline CPI has been
rising over the past three months while the rate of change of the
rate of change in food/beverage and energy prices have been
falling. So what's been rising? We're glad you asked.
Transportation, Education, Medical care, recreation and
"other" goods and services pricing, that's what.
Do you think we can adjust the core CPI reading to eliminate these
as non-essential or too volatile, as is the case with the
elimination of food and energy?
One
last chart we believe is helpful in the current environment.
A quick explanation for what is otherwise a "noisy"
chart. What you see below is the difference between the
annual rate of change in headline CPI and CPI less energy.
In other words, we are isolating the impact of rising energy
prices on the headline CPI. Simple enough? Overlaid on
top is the Fed Funds rate.

If
you'll indulge us for a minute, a few observations.
Historically, the Fed has responded to rising energy prices that
can and do influence the general level of inflationary pressures
over time. As you can see above, the most significant
instances of this phenomenon were seen in the mid-1970's and early
1980's. Clearly crude prices were advancing handsomely in
both of these periods. Even during 1999 and into early 2000,
the Fed was raising the Funds rate as the absolute dollar price of
crude nearly doubled. We've shaded this periods in blue in
the chart above for clear visibility. We believe that based
on the historical data above, in the past the Fed has acknowledged
and responded to meaningful increases in the price of energy
commodities over short periods of time. This is exactly the
message of history. Why then is the current energy pricing
environment only "temporary", according to Greenspan?
Why the lack of meaningful current monetary response relative to
what has happened over the last half century when the influence of
rising energy prices on the CPI is as meaningful now as that which
we have experienced in prior cycles? Although the Fed
currently offers no public answer for this obvious change in
current attitude toward rising energy prices, we believe the
answer is simple. The Fed simply does not have the
flexibility at present to put forth a monetary response to
meaningfully higher energy prices as it has in the past. The
extremely levered nature of the US economy precludes such a
response as would be consistent with historical precedent.
Is there any other answer you can think of? We believe the
Fed has two clear choices. Accelerate monetary tightening to
head off burgeoning inflationary pressures and risk a debt related
negative total economy response to rising rates, or keep short
term interest rates in negative territory and jawbone about
"contained" inflationary pressures. Oh yes, the
second choice also involves a certain amount of
praying.
Placing Your Wagers...One
of the most powerful drivers of the general level of inflation
over time has been wage inflation. We saw this in a big way
during the 1970's when mid-to-high single digit annual wage
increases were more the norm than not. As you may remember,
the year over year change in service sector wages right now is
running at 2.6%. (The bulk of the jobs created over the past
15 months have been service sector jobs.) In other words, at
the moment, the year over year change in service sector wages is
negative (below the year over year change in the CPI). But,
as you can see below, periods of negative annual wage gains were
more than present in the 1970's. In fact, they virtually
characterized the period. Yes, wage growth is a big driver
of inflationary pressures. But we suggest that sustained
negative wage growth is a sign that inflationary pressures are
building and may be much greater than is anticipated by the
public. Especially wage paying members of the public who
actually have employees. Is the current experience a tip off
that inflationary pressures are building perhaps even more than
the public realizes? Admittedly, it's a bit of a tough call
at present given the labor outsourcing opportunities available to
corporate America. Nonetheless, it's yet another anecdote
from the treasure box of historical experience.

As
we move into 2005 and beyond, we believe the idea that current
inflationary pressures are "well contained" will be
challenged in the financial markets. We believe this is to
be an investment theme of importance looking forward, with
implications for investments in fixed income vehicles, the metals,
commodities, TIPs, etc. Despite what may be consensus
thinking or Fedspeak of the moment regarding supposedly contained
headline inflationary pressures, now is the time to start thinking
about and implementing portfolio hedges against a shift in
inflationary perceptions and expectations ahead. One last
comment. As you know, we have not even touched on
inflationary pressures already building in the greater global
economy. China has already acknowledged these pressures.
Moreover, academically a declining domestic currency is the devils
playground in terms of building inflationary pressure.
Dependent on the direction of the dollar ahead, it just may not be
too long until commentary regarding the importing of increasing
inflationary pressure starts to heat up in meaningful fashion.
Are
we about to experience a replay of the 1970's experience with
inflation? At this point, who the heck knows. But what
seems apparent to us is that the structural breeding ground for
rising inflationary pressure is in place. For now, the
incubation and realization process remains to be seen in terms of
ultimate magnitude of inflationary pressure. What we suggest
is important, though, is the potential for shifting perceptions
and changing expectations ahead. These are the swing factors
that can and do influence financial asset prices in a meaningful
manner. As they used to say in the old Cisco commercials,
"are you ready?"
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