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April 2004
Home
Is The Heart (Of The Matter)
Home Is The Heart (Of The Matter)...The
Fed Flow of Funds report for the period ended 4Q 2003 hit the
Street a number of weeks back. You might remember that
the 3Q report was delayed considerably into the early part of this
year. We always consider the Flow of Funds report to be
nothing short of a treasure trove of data for anyone having the time and
endurance to plow through approximately 140+ pages of nothing but
numbers. As per the recent Flow of Funds report, to suggest
that 2003 was a year of significant credit driven reflation is simply an
understatement. Here are some very broad overview numbers to
help put current circumstances into perspective.
|
SECTOR |
Growth
In 2003 |
Total
Sector Debt Outstanding Has Doubled Since |
|
|
|
Total Credit
Market Debt |
8.7% |
1Q 1995 |
|
Household Debt |
10.6 |
2Q 1995 |
|
Non-Financial
Corporate Debt |
3.4 |
4Q 1992 |
|
Financial Sector
Debt |
10.1 |
1Q 1998 |
|
|
|
Nominal GDP |
5.9% |
4Q 1988 |
|
|
|
GSE Debt |
10.4% |
4Q 1998 |
|
Asset Backed
Issuer Debt |
11.5 |
3Q 1998 |
|
Federal Mortgage
Pools |
10.5 |
4Q 1996 |
Just as a very quick note, the doubling in
nominal GDP since 1988 is not a typo. Although most forms of
systemic leverage have doubled in well under 10 years, it has
taken nominal US GDP over 15 years to double. The table
above is clear in its message, households and the financial sector
were primarily responsible for credit expansion and broader
systemic liquidity creation in 2003. On the asset side of
the equation, the success of reflation in 2003 was simply more than
evident as per the Flow of Funds report. We included wages and salaries as well as payroll
employment numbers for reference in the following table.
|
Household
Balance Sheet Item |
Growth
In 2003 |
Growth
Since 4Q 1999 |
|
|
|
Household
Real Estate |
10.3% |
45.9% |
|
Household
Financial Assets |
12.9 |
(1.9) |
|
Household
Liabilities |
10.7 |
41.9 |
|
|
|
Household
Net Worth |
11.5% |
10.2% |
|
|
|
Wages
And Salaries |
2.6% |
11.7% |
|
Payroll
Employment |
(0.1) |
(0.4) |
We ask you quite importantly and quite sincerely,
just where would our economy be today had it not been for
household real estate inflation over the last four years?
You probably do not want to know the answer. All of the data
in the tables above point to the same conclusion. The
leveraging of continuously inflating real estate values over the
last four years has been absolutely crucial to the economy.
Whether Greenspan will ever admit it or not, this is exactly how
the Fed "has successfully dealt with the aftermath of the
stock market bubble". All of these numbers come
directly from the Fed. The very same folks who simply cannot
be ignorant of their meaning. The problem, of course, being
just what will or can the Fed attempt to inflate next if the
residential real estate market runs into price turbulence at such
a presently high altitude? Especially given that the labor
market appears a bit under the weather and wage and salary growth
is not even keeping pace with lowball estimates of understated
headline inflation. As of the end of 4Q 2003, household real
estate assets totaled approximately $15.1 trillion.
Household financial assets climbed to $34.3 trillion during the
same period, but of this equities account for only about $8
trillion. The bottom line is that residential real estate is
almost twice as meaningful to households in terms of total
household assets as are stock holdings specifically.
Although a number of stock market followers may be concerned about
an equity crash or severe downturn ahead, maybe what they should
really be worried about is US residential real estate values.
In terms of total household well being, emotional stability and
forward perceptions, there is no other singular household asset
class that means as much in dollar terms. Not even pension
entitlements. Get the picture?

And, as you know, this is how we have treated
this precious asset over the last half century. We've
levered it like there's simply no tomorrow.

If Tomorrow Never Comes...Although equity
as a percentage of the (inflated) market value of residential real
estate in 4Q was up very modestly from 2Q and 3Q of last year, on
a year over year basis, we ended 2003 with the lowest percentage
of collective residential real estate equity relative to the total
market value of household real estate in US history.
Moreover, although it is very clear that nominal real estate
prices continued their skyward ascent in favored areas such as the
bicoastal regions of the country during last year, we find a
statistic published by the Federal Housing Finance Board quite
interesting and worthy of both current note and tracking ahead.
These folks publish the history of purchase prices of all homes
financed with conventional single family mortgages. This
includes both new and existing homes. What you see in the
chart below is both the history of aggregate home prices and the
accompanying monthly year over year rate of change.

It just so happens that January
of this year (the latest data) was comping against a very strong
like January period of 2003, hence the year over year rate of
change is modestly negative. Nonetheless, the recent
trajectory of moving price rate of change is almost straight down
from an annual rate of change cycle peak in January of last year.
Hard to believe to be honest. Headline numbers regarding
housing prices sure don't seem to support this declining rate of
change data at all. As you can
probably barely make out above, historical experience in the
current annualized rate of change area in which we find ourselves
at present has been accompanied by relatively flat home prices in
forward periods.
This type of occurrence was both obvious and extended in duration
during the late 1980's and early 1990's. In the early 1980's
experience, prices grew at a much less accelerated rate than in
the late 1970's when, once again, the zero annual rate of change environment
occurred. Are we potentially just at the entry point of a period of price
flattening in very broad real estate prices as evidenced by this
data? Again, we do not see it in the rather sensational
bicoastal price quotations, but we need to remember that cyclical
real estate price weakness in the late 1980's did not begin in the
bicoastal areas, but rather ended there.
In juxtaposition to what you see
above, the most widely followed home price data in the US comes
from the OFHEO (Office of Federal Housing Enterprise
Oversight). What you see below is the annualized quarter
over quarter change in their HPI (Housing Price Index).

Essentially breathtaking quarterly change in
4Q 2003. But just who are we to believe when it comes to the
macro trend in housing prices, the OFHEO or the Federal Housing
Finance Board data? First, the OFHEO data, despite being the most
widely watched, is a bit quirky. During periods of
extraordinary refi activity, it could very well be that the OFHEO
data is understating the rise in housing prices as many refi's are
being done with no new appraisal. Mortgage providers are
simply resetting terms for a nice fee for current clients.
Subsequently when refi's die down, the OFHEO data is simply
playing catch up ball. That's exactly what we think happened
in the 4Q data you see above. Another further explanation in
the apparent discrepancy between these two housing price data sets
lies in the relationship between fixed and adjustable rate
mortgage lending. Adjustable
rate mortgages as a percentage of total mortgages outstanding
spiked over the last year without a coincidental spike in interest
rates in general. As you can see in the following chart,
historically the use of adjustable rate mortgages usually
accelerates when interest rates rise, as would seem rational.
But recently, those taking on new mortgages are going adjustable
at close to the lowest fixed mortgage rates of our lifetimes.
Clearly, this phenomenon is happening for one of two reasons.
Either home buyers are absolutely convinced interest rates are going even
lower, or a good portion of current buyers are no longer able to
qualify for higher cost fixed mortgages, despite their incredibly
low absolute rate levels. Does this hint at the last
marginal buyer influencing current prices?

Could it be that the current popularity of
lower cost adjustable rate mortgage debt is skewing the OFHEO
housing price data
to the high side, given that the Federal Finance Housing Board
data does not include prices of homes financed with adjustable
mortgages? Could be to a point. In one sense, it would
certainly be a tribute to what in large part we would characterize
as the "minimum monthly payment economy" of the
moment. After all, tomorrow may never come, right?
Is Everybody In Yet?...For now, the home ownership
rate in the US sits at an all time high as of the end of 2003.
What we believe is important to note is that as the home ownership
rate flattened between 1988 and the mid-1990's, we also
experienced coincidental flattening of home prices as per the
Federal Housing Finance Board data in the chart above. Seems
simply common sense. Perhaps one clue as to a potential near
term peaking in residential real estate prices will be a distinct
flattening in the aggregate US home ownership rate somewhere
ahead. In looking at the chart below, the rate of annual
change in the US home ownership rate has been slowing over the
past few years relative to the rocket launch in rate of change
during the mid-1990's. But to declare even a short term peak
quite yet is still a bit premature.

What we also
find interesting and perhaps very telling about just where we are
in the present residential real estate cycle is the historical
complexion of real estate buyers as categorized by age
demographics. The following table documents the long term
homeownership rate in this country by age classification:
|
US
HOMEOWNERSHIP RATE BY AGE CLASSIFICATION |
|
Year |
Less Than 35 |
35 to 44 |
45 to 54 |
55 to 64 |
Over 65 |
|
|
|
1982 |
41.2% |
70.0% |
77.4% |
80.0% |
74.4% |
|
1983 |
40.7 |
69.3 |
77.0 |
79.9 |
74.4 |
|
1984 |
40.5 |
68.9 |
76.5 |
80.0 |
75.0 |
|
1985 |
39.9 |
68.1 |
75.9 |
79.5 |
75.1 |
|
1986 |
39.6 |
67.3 |
76.0 |
79.9 |
74.8 |
|
1987 |
39.5 |
67.2 |
76.1 |
80.2 |
75.0 |
|
1988 |
39.3 |
66.9 |
75.6 |
79.5 |
75.5 |
|
1989 |
39.1 |
66.6 |
75.5 |
79.6 |
75.8 |
|
1990 |
38.5 |
66.3 |
75.2 |
79.3 |
76.3 |
|
1991 |
37.8 |
65.8 |
74.8 |
80.0 |
77.2 |
|
1992 |
37.6 |
65.1 |
75.1 |
80.2 |
77.1 |
|
1993 |
37.3 |
65.1 |
75.3 |
79.9 |
77.3 |
|
1994 |
37.3 |
64.5 |
75.2 |
79.3 |
77.4 |
|
1995 |
38.6 |
65.2 |
75.2 |
79.5 |
78.1 |
|
1996 |
39.1 |
65.5 |
75.6 |
80.0 |
78.9 |
|
1997 |
39.7 |
66.1 |
75.8 |
80.1 |
79.1 |
|
1998 |
39.3 |
66.9 |
75.7 |
80.9 |
79.3 |
|
1999 |
39.7 |
67.2 |
76.0 |
81.0 |
80.1 |
|
2000 |
40.8 |
67.9 |
76.5 |
80.3 |
80.4 |
|
2001 |
41.2 |
68.2 |
76.7 |
81.3 |
80.3 |
|
2002 |
41.3 |
68.8 |
76.3 |
81.1 |
80.5 |
|
2003 |
42.7 |
69.0 |
76.4 |
81.5 |
80.8 |
Although it's
not wildly surprising by any means, it's absolutely crystal clear
that the younger folks predominantly drove the macro US homeownership
rate higher in the late 1990's and early into this decade.
It's also clear that homeownership rates among those under 45 are
more cyclical than is the case with other age groups. And
this is the same age classification of younger folks driving
current home ownership rates higher whose current trajectory of
unemployment demographics look a whole lot different than the
direction of the headline aggregate unemployment rate of the
moment.

As you know, what you see above
is quite a contrast to the official headline unemployment rate
trends of the last year or so.
Quite a contrast indeed. So it seems pretty obvious that the
drivers of the increase in the home ownership rate since the
mid-1990's, and more so since year end 1999, are those clearly bearing a good portion of the brunt
of current labor market weakness over the past four years.
Does this suggest that housing prices have elevated based on a
rock solid wage driven financial footing, especially in the case
of new younger buyers over the last 5+ years? You probably
didn't need us to drag you through all of this primary data.
It's simple. Financial leverage is driving housing demand
among those least able to afford it and among those quite
susceptible to current labor market weakness as is displayed
above. When it comes to the current housing cycle, that's
the heart of the matter, shall we say.
The Flow Down...From
the Fed's Flow of Funds data, we find the following graphical data
quite revealing. What you see below is the quarter over
quarter growth rate in household real estate holdings based on the
Fed's version of market value. Notice anything funny?

Quarterly growth in household
real estate values at market per the Fed's data in the fourth
quarter of last year has no parallel over the last three years at
least. A period of significant housing price inflation and
some of the lowest mortgage rates on record. Of
course the 4Q 2003 experience comes literally one quarter after
the for now bottom in mortgage finance rates. In conjunction
with this price burst, total household net worth climbed to a new
high as 2003 came to an end. In the following chart we
document the historical components of household net worth.
Once again, it's clear as to what has driven household net worth
over the last four years as financial assets are not yet back to
their prior annual peak set in late 1999.

Although 2003 was one heck of a
snap back year for equities in this country, household holdings of
equities grew $1.1 trillion in 2003 while the market value of
household real estate apparently jumped $1.4 trillion. Again, when we
get right down to the bottom line, which is more meaningful to
households, real estate or common stocks? If you ask us, any
so-called wealth effect is being primarily driven by ascending
real estate values. Real estate values very heavily
dependent on the existing US credit bubble. And dependent on
its continued expansion.
Too Much Of Everything Is Just Enough?...Picking
tops in any asset class is dangerous work. Especially for an
asset class driven by the Molotov cocktail of mania thinking,
record setting financial leverage, and credit bubble
characteristic ease of access to credit itself. With
accelerating real estate values and the continuation of a low
absolute interest rate environment, as well as very aggressive mortgage financing opportunities, the self
reinforcing cycle of higher prices and growth in aggregate
leverage could have further to run for all we know. Yet at
the same time, we already have many ingredients completely in place for the ultimate conclusion of the current residential real
estate cycle. A conclusion that just might be quite dramatic
and have very meaningful consequences not only for the domestic economy
but the global economy as well. The fact that US wage and
salary growth is
basically stagnant at the current time compared to understated
inflation rates (a near fifty year low on an
annualized rate of change basis) is ultimately a serious and
negative financial
underpinning to real estate values that cannot be dismissed
lightly. In like manner, the current era of global wage
arbitrage has huge implications for really global real estate
values in our opinion, especially over the longer term. Not only are we redistributing
forward wealth in terms of significant global wage rate
differentials, but ultimately it would seem logical that we
redistribute geographically specific real estate values that are supported by
those same wage rates. From our point of view, at this point
in the broader global economic cycle, global wage rate arbitrage
opportunities are still in their infancy. The build up of
household mortgage debt in the US will ultimately limit consumer
flexibility at some point ahead, especially when combined with the
fact that adjustable rate mortgages comprise 30+% of new current
mortgage activity. From our perspective, the thought that households
have substituted tax advantaged mortgage debt for non-tax
advantaged consumer credit is complete garbage. A simple
look at the facts from the Fed's own data tells the story.
Both have accelerated in directional similarity.

Again, although timing is the ever present
uncertainty, it would be very easy for us to conclude based on the
factual data that the current US residential housing cycle has
been pushed to extraordinary lengths based on credit bubble
dynamics. In fact the final straw may very well be the
recent spike in adjustable rate financing without any
corresponding spike in fixed rate costs. In like manner,
even a leveling off or minor price
retracement in this asset class would have very significant
consequences for US consumer spending and broader systemic
liquidity creation. It's certainly no secret that the Fed is
clearly in the "inflate or die" mode at the
present. And the key asset in terms of household
participation in the "inflate or die" campaign is
residential real estate. Up to this point, the Fed has been
completely unsuccessful in "reflating" payroll
employment growth as well as wage and salary growth. Hence,
residential real estate inflation has rested almost entirely on
the health and continued expansion of the credit bubble, as well
as mania thinking on the part of buyers. We suggest that
unless meaningful job and wage growth is clearly evident directly
ahead, residential real estate is skating on very thin ice.
Ice that could easily be broken by continued payroll weakness
accompanied by the coming conclusion of direct consumer stimulus,
to say nothing of potential upward movement in interest rates.
Maybe rather than suggesting that US residential real estate
prices are a credit dependent a time bomb with an already lit fuse,
let us briefly have a look at one last chart. Here's the
experience of year over year change in new dwelling construction
in Japan from 1988 through to year end 2003. Obviously it encompasses
the post stock market Nikkei bubble peak in late 1989.
Clearly enthusiasm for residential real estate continued, at least
for a while, even as the Japanese Nikkei and economy began sinking
significantly in the early to mid 1990's. Of course
necessarily accompanying this spurt in Japanese residential
construction were large declines in Japanese interest rates post
the stock market bubble peak. As the Nikkei crested in early
1990, the Japanese discount rate was approximately 5.5%. By
the time the residential construction boom ended in 1996, the
Japanese discount rate was 0.5%. It's just a good thing that
our present experience in the US is nothing like what occurred in
Japan a decade back, right?

At The Wire...Just prior to
publishing, we received some info we believe indispensable in
terms of suggesting where we are in the residential real estate
cycle of the moment. You may remember that our home perch is the San
Francisco Bay Area. In other words, the outer limits when it
comes to unbelievable price activity in residential real
estate. We can certainly attest to you that present
conditions in the SF Bay Area are nothing short of a frenzy, and
we're not being melodramatic in that characterization. From
the office of the State of California that issues real estate
licenses, here it comes. Real estate licenses issued by the
State increased 44% during the 2002-2003 period (47,000 new
licenses issued). Relative to the 2000-2001 period?
Licenses issued are up 95%. That's right, a doubling in less
than four years. Remember, this is not the number of total
realtors, but rather the number of new licenses issued. If
this isn't a testimony to feverish mania, then what is? As
you may remember, we saw the same thing with CFA test applicants
in the late 1990's about ten seconds prior to the equity peak. As always, everyone wants a
ticket to the
promised land. At least until it turns into a dust bowl,
anyway.
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