|
September 2003
The
Ultimate Relay Race?
Anemia...It's really no
secret at all that the most recent recession was one of the shallowest on record. The headline GDP numbers covering
the recessionary period and its immediate aftermath belie the fact
that for labor markets and corporate capital spending experience,
it has been one of the worst recessionary and post recessionary
episodes in recent history. The shallowest headline GDP
recession in decades has been followed up, at least so far, with
one of the shallowest headline GDP recoveries in decades.
The following table details experience in the five quarters post
official recession conclusions of the last half century. We've
averaged data point experience in the last eight recessions to
compare with current experience:
|
Data Point |
Average Of Eight
Prior Post Recessionary Periods |
Present Experience |
|
Cumulative GDP
Growth In 5 Qtrs Post Recession |
8.6% |
3.3% |
|
Absolute
Percentage Point Contribution To GDP In Post Recesion 5
Qtr Period |
|
Personal
Consumption |
3.6 |
1.79 |
|
Nonresidential
Investment |
0.80 |
(0.25) |
|
Residential
Investment |
0.93 |
0.33 |
|
Inventories |
1.49 |
0.79 |
|
Exports |
0.38 |
0.27 |
|
Imports |
(0.57) |
(0.69) |
|
Government
Spending |
0.55 |
0.56 |
In addition to the current post
recessionary period experiencing anemic growth relative to the
average of the prior eight post recessionary periods, current
experience as reflected in the numbers above is occurring amidst
the greatest of all post recessionary monetary and fiscal policy
stimulus efforts ever seen. As we and others have mentioned
a number of times, the closest parallel to our current experience
is the post recessionary period of the early 1990's. If we
stripped out the early 1990's recovery data from the column in the
above table detailing average five quarter post recession
performance, the numbers would increase across the board with the
exception of imports (imports being an academic drag on the GDP
calculation). Moreover, relative to the early 1990's, both
labor and corporate capital spending improvement is lagging badly
at the moment. In spending a minute or two looking at the
above table, it's clear that early in economic rebound periods,
personal consumption, and everything that goes with it such as
inventory rebuilding, is critical to the ultimate growth
equation. Corporate capital spending follows a pick up in
consumption activity just as naturally as night follows day.
But as we have chronicled a good number of times now, during the
most recent recession, personal consumption never really turned
down into negative rate of change territory as has been the case
in prior recession experience. Hence the contribution
of personal consumption to GDP growth post the recent official
recession has been weak relative to historical experience.
There really was no downturn from which to rebound in terms of
consumption.
We bring this up because in
very recent economic data, anecdotes have appeared that suggest
consumers are wobbling a bit. Maybe a good bit. And
the recent rise in longer dated Treasury yields so key as
reference rates determining the cost of consumer credit on many
fronts are suggesting that headwinds to forward debt based
household consumption are beginning to blow a bit more
furiously. And what has accompanied these headwinds is the
thought that the economy is firming on a broad basis. The
thought that corporate capital spending is being passed the GDP
growth baton from the personal consumer sector. Just as has
been the case in prior post recession experience.
The Changing Of The Guard?...Although
one or two data points do not make a trend, we are witnessing
current anecdotes that suggest to us that cracks are appearing in
the ability of households to continue supporting the economy
looking ahead, at least in the fashion they have over the past
three years or so. The recent consumer credit report
revealed an actual contraction in month over month consumer credit
outstanding. That might not sound like a big deal, but do
you know how many times this has occurred on a month over month
basis during the last ten years? Three, including last
month. Looking back across many decades, contractions in
consumer credit outstanding have only really occurred at
significant recessionary troughs. As you can see in the
following chart that chronicles year over year changes in total
consumer credit outstanding, very much unlike prior post
recessionary experience, the rate of change in annual consumer
growth is currently in decline. It's clear that in
historical post recessionary periods it has spiked higher as the
forces of pent up consumer demand were unleashed upon a more
broadly
recovering economy. As for this cycle, there largely is no
pent up demand to be expressed as we move forward. At least
not of a magnitude characterizing prior post recessionary
experience.

Of course the conventional
Street response to this contraction in consumer credit is that
folks must simply be substituting mortgage debt for consumer debt
at the moment. Sounds reasonable enough. The only hook
in the story is that actual cash out refi's as a percentage of
total refi's happen to have been contracting relatively
significantly in the second quarter. The following chart
details eighteen and one-half years of cash out mortgage refi
activity as a percentage of total refi activity. The bar in this data is set awfully low as it
measures the percentage of refi activity where the new mortgage is
only 5% or more in excess of the original loan amount being
refinanced. As you know, in most cases 5% of home prices
won't even make a dent in terms of possibly remodeling the
kitchen. What the quarterly data that measures activity
through 2Q '03 shows is that the most recent quarter recorded a
record low reading for the data series of cash out refi activity
as a percentage of total refi activity. On a percentage of
total loan basis, there was less cash pulled out of real estate in
2Q than in any other quarter over the past few decades.
Certainly on an absolute dollar basis, though, it was far from the
low.

Are folks really substituting
mortgage debt for alternative forms of consumer credit at the
moment, or are households at last seemingly beginning the long anticipated
balance sheet reconciliation process? A process Greenspan
apparently believes, as per his most recent testimony, has already
been completed. Of course he could not be more incorrect as
it really never even started in the first place during this
cycle. Although it's still far too early to tell, given the
recent contraction in consumer credit outstanding and concurrent
drop in cash out refi activity as a percentage of the refi whole,
households may just be at the forefront of leverage
retrenchment. And here you thought it might never happen.
Another anecdote that clearly
took us by surprise a few weeks back was the balance of trade
report. And the surprise was not the fact that the deficit
contracted noticeably, but rather the makeup of the components
that drove the contraction. Exports actually grew while
total imports remained basically flat. Finally the triumph of a
weaker dollar? Only partly. Exports of capital goods,
consumer goods and industrial supplies all registered gains that
collectively totaled $1.5 billion, but the highlight of the report
in our minds was the $1.2 billion contraction in imports of
consumer goods. Maybe it's just a one-off event, but on a
$40 billion monthly trade deficit number, a contraction of $1.2
billion in imported consumer goods stands out like a sore
thumb. Either Wal-Mart and friends decided to tighten up
inventories in a vice grip, or this is a tell tale sign of a US
consumer unable to hold up the continued acceleration in the
importation of cheap foreign-sourced consumer goods.
Again, these are just anecdotes
of recent note for now relating to consumer activity. Far
from in place or definitive trends at the moment. But if
weakness in consumer credit growth, cash out refi's and the
importing of consumer goods persists ahead, it will be
telegraphing a message of a US consumer who is growing quite weary
relative to behavior of the last few years. Behavior that
has been the very support of the US economy. Maybe it's no
wonder that a potential capital spending revival has become the
rallying cry for the equity market as of late.
The comments
above relate to rate of change in consumer leverage
acceptance. Our final thoughts regarding the consumer are
really nothing new. As you can see in the following chart,
as part of the overall theme of a lack of a decline in consumer
spending during the latest recessionary cycle, auto sales not only
held up, but even accelerated during the official recession.
There was no downturn this go around from which to recover.
Again, clearly related to apparently attractive consumer financing
of the past, it leaves a currently recovering economy without one
of its key historical accelerants.

Furthermore, and maybe even most
importantly, we may be witnessing the literal rate of change peak
in the housing cycle as we speak. With the very significant
back up in mortgage rates as of late, it's becoming a much greater
possibility than not. Recent new and existing home sales
data were quite strong. While existing home sales hit a record,
new homes were just shy of record levels. Likewise, the most
recent housing starts data hit an absolute number not seen since
1986. Has the upward jolt to mortgage interest rates over
the last few months caused former fence sitters to literally
panic into short term real estate purchase mode? It's a good
bet that this is a big part of the rationale for recent
strength. Although the world isn't quite ready to come to an
end, it's starting to appear as if we have reached the peak of the
housing cycle. In addition to housing starts now being at a
high not seen since 1986, starts have been in the longest up trend
in half a century at least during this cycle. Moreover, US
existing home prices as a percentage of median family income just
hit a new high for the post war era at least. Year over
year, new home prices have accelerated 17.5% and existing homes up
13.8%. In terms of both starts and pricing, we believe the chances of
us experiencing a rate of change peak right here are much better
than 50/50.
Not surprisingly, though, what
may ultimately be much more meaningful to the housing cycle this
go around is plain old-fashioned cost of capital. It just so
happens that over the last three decades, every time the absolute
level of conventional thirty year mortgage rates has exceeded its twelve month
moving average for a meaningful period of time, housing starts
have turned down. For now, 30 year mortgage rates have
spiked above their twelve month moving average of the
moment. The key in looking ahead, of course, is determining
for how long this will be the case. History tells us that
the longer this relationship persists, the more bearish the
environment becomes for the homebuilders, at least in terms of new
housing start experience. The following charts is pretty
clear on the relationship of mortgage interest rates to their
twelve month moving average, and subsequent housing starts
activity.

Lastly, in terms of housing, US
existing home prices relative to median family income just hit a
new post war high. The prior high was seen in the early
1980's. Quite simplistically, this relationship suggests
that never on a macro basis have existing homes been less affordable to US
households anywhere in the last half century than now.
Again, this doesn't necessarily portend disaster ahead, but rather
leaves open the question of forward pricing and affordability
issues. From our perspective, housing industry anecdotes of
the moment are quite suggestive of cyclical topping experience.
Two large consumer driven
engines of recent period economic growth appear to be topping or
having topped as we speak. Except for brief monthly spikes,
monthly auto sales have been trending lower for some time.
For now, housing sure looks like peak activity to us. Moreover, slowing cash out refi
and consumer credit expansion data suggest debt burdened
households are at best taking a break from accelerating credit
expansion at the moment. The facts tell us that it's more
than just a reasonable possibility that the consumer that has
really been holding up the economy for the last few years is
simply weary.
The Ultimate Relay Race?...Can
the current economy experience an acceptable passing of the GDP
baton from the consumer sector to the corporate sector ahead
without either of these runners stumbling? Without the
consumer athletes dropping from exhaustion prior to a clean
handoff to their corporate sector counterparts? In the
stands, the monetary and fiscal policy fans are giving it their
all in terms of encouraging the athletes. The cheering has
never been more vociferous. On the Street, market
participants have already claimed relay race victory as measured
by the valuations they have accorded equity securities at the
moment, especially those companies cyclically sensitive to a
broadly improving economy. Can the corporate capital spending hopefuls reclaim
the glory that was once theirs in the mid-to-late 1990's? As
you know, anything can happen, but let's have a little look at a
few facts that will hopefully help frame the upcoming leg of the
GDP relay race.
Although this data is a bit
dated (it's the latest we have), capital spending by approximate
industry sectors in 2001 was as follows:
|
CAPEX
In 2001 |
|
Industry Sectors |
$ Billions |
% Of Total |
|
|
|
Finance,
Insurance, Real Estate |
$171 |
24.1% |
|
Manufacturing |
153 |
21.6 |
|
Info/Tech |
106 |
15.0 |
|
Construction,
Mining, Utility |
84 |
11.9 |
|
Retail/Wholesale |
59 |
8.4 |
|
Other Services |
45 |
6.4 |
|
Transportation
& Warehousing |
41 |
5.8 |
|
Health Care |
26 |
3.7 |
|
Professional &
Technical |
23 |
3.3 |
|
|
|
TOTAL |
$709 |
|
Of course as we look ahead, we
have to ask ourselves just who will drive macro corporate capital
spending if indeed this phenomenon is to take place in a
significant manner. As we look at the table above for
potential guidance as to where strength may lie ahead, we have
some very big sector players here whose forward capital spending
behavior is at the very least open to question. In terms of
finance, insurance and real estate, heavy spending in 2001 was
clearly related to technology infrastructure. Despite the
anticipatory movement in the tech stocks during the recent rally,
the reality of actual meaningful (more than simply replacement
spending) tech spending is still elusive at this point.
Also, the recent reality of higher interest rates isn't exactly
the prescription for accelerating profitability in finance and
real estate specifically. Secondly, given the accelerated
outsourcing of more of our manufacturing base during the latest
soft economic period and the continuing struggle of the overall
sector itself, just how much capital spending punch can we really
expect from manufacturing? Is GM or Ford ready to build new
plant or remodel old plant extensively? With certainty, they
will need to replace worn out equipment, but we see little reason
to expect capacity expansion. Expansion that characterizes
significant capital spending upcycles. In terms of
information or broader tech industry capital spending, bellwether
AMAT's experience pretty much says it all. They are still
shedding bodies after having done so in each of the last two
years. Broadly, tech remains plagued by overcapacity.
Lack of pricing power in the industry is simply testimony to the
fact. Anecdotally, on the global scene, China recently
announced that by year end, all government ministries will be
required to purchase local (meaning Chinese produced) software at
their next upgrade cycles. Simply music to the ears of Bill
Gates, Larry Ellison and Craig Conway, right? Many of the
service sectors you see above most levered to interest rates in
terms of forward profitability were the largest capital equipment
spenders in 2001.
There is no question that the
fiscal and monetary stimulus of the moment is going to spark some
type of positive economic response ahead. It's already
started, at least as per the 2Q 2003 GDP numbers. But the
singular largest issue concerning this recovery is
sustainability. Moreover, as we look back at historical
capital spending experience, we believe it is very important to
note that significant capital spending booms are a bit more
anomalistic that not. We suggest that banking on a large
scale capital spending revival above and beyond the real need to
simply replace worn out capital stock at the moment is still a bit
premature. Especially following so soon on the heels of the
tech led capital spending boom of the late 1990's. The
following chart depicts capital spending (nonresidential fixed
investment as a proxy) as a percentage of total GDP over the prior
four decades. It's our belief that very significant capital
spending booms have been created by anomalistic circumstances as
opposed to normal business cycle events.

In the two instances where
capital spending in any cycle accounted for 13% or more of total
GDP over the last forty years, explanations appear relatively
logical. The energy related capital spending boom of the
mid-to-late 1970's was in clear response to the price spike of
energy commodities during that decade. Despite higher
interest rates and a recession in 1980, capital spending as a
percentage of GDP just continued moving higher. In fact the
build up of energy capacity in the
late 1970's and early 1980's led to decades of weak energy prices
to follow and a bust in sectors such as drilling and oil service.
There is simply no question that capital spending in the
mid-to-latter portion of the last decade was driven by the
technology revolution upon us at the time - telecommunications,
hardware and software. Of course the little Y2K related
technology scare simply threw gasoline on an open tech related
capital spending fire. Again,
a boom that created so much capacity globally that the industry is
still paying the price in spades in terms of sated demand and lack
of pricing power. Can
we really expect a meaningful renewal of capital spending so soon
after the boom in the prior decade?
We think not. Lastly,
as you can see in the chart, during huge booms capital spending only
accounted for 13-14% of total GDP at most.
As we have shown you time and again, consumer spending is
what makes this economy go. And
if we are even close to smelling a tired consumer in the anecdotes
we mentioned above, corporations will surely react by pulling back
on all but necessary capex. Just
as they have done for the past few years.
For now, a few
signs of life in corporate capital spending have shown themselves
in recent data. The
2Q GDP report revealed a pop in tech related business equipment
spending. During the
period it was virtually all hardware related.
But as you can see in the following chart, broader spending
in the economy on business equipment has not yet even turned
positive on a year over year rate of change basis.
Prior post recessionary recoveries have zoomed into double
digit rate of change acceleration territory in short order as far
as business equipment spending is concerned.
The exception, of course, being the early 1990's. For
now, business equipment spending is recovering from multi-decade
low rate of change experience. We'll just have to see how
far it goes from here. 3Q tech industry earnings reports and
management commentary should be awfully telling.

Although
the recent industrial production report achieved the obligatory
"beat the expectations" characterization, it left little
to warm one's heart. Excluding
vehicles and increased electric and gas utility output, the 0.5%
headline industrial production number was a whole lot closer to
zero (or less). (Anecdotally,
non-durable consumer goods production declined 0.9%.
Another wonderful consumer related data point of the
moment.) Again, in
prior post recessionary periods, the annual rate of change in
durable materials industrial production (capital asset related
durables production) shot into double digit territory without even
breaking a sweat. So far this go around, we've just experienced a false start.

There
is no question that if a true and meaningful capital spending
upcycle is in the works for the immediate future, we're still very
early in the game. We should be witnessing improvement in
what you see above as well as many other statistical data points
as we move forward. It's clear that the manufacturing
indices (ISM) of late have been moving in the right direction.
Even capital equipment pricing in the most recent PPI report displayed
a one month increase of a magnitude not seen in almost two years.
But a lot of what we see currently in terms of capital spending
strength is a bounce off of severely depressed results of the past
few years. A bounce that so far has all the earmarks of
replacement spending as opposed to new plant and equipment
additions.
We'll
leave you with one last anecdote regarding the cycle of capital
spending in economic cycles of the past. As you will see in
the following chart, there has been a highly correlated
relationship between the year over year rate of change in
non-residential fixed investment and the headline capacity
utilization rate over time. We've speculated in the past on
just which of these is the chicken and which the egg. But
leaving that aside, it's the historical symmetry in directional
movement that we believe is important ahead as a corroborative
validation of a true upturn in capital spending. As you will
see below, over the recent past the annualized rate of change
improvement in non-residential fixed investment has not as of yet
been validated by an improvement in system wide capacity
utilization. At least based on historical precedent, we
would expect directional change symmetry to come into play at some
point in the near future. Either broad capacity utilization
begins to improve or the recent rate of change improvement in
non-residential fixed investment (capital spending) will be short lived. Maybe
this relationship will be twisted or invalidated in the current
cycle given the incredible stimulus being applied to the economic
patient at the moment, but for now, we have the prior 35 years of relational
experience on which to lean. For now, we believe the
following relationship bears close monitoring, especially given
the fact that the equity markets have recently been waiting for no such
validation.

If
the consumer is beginning to wobble a bit, as we are seeing in
current numbers, a perfect GDP growth baton handoff to the corporate sector
is imperative in moving this economy forward. Never before
has the economy been supported by so much fiscal and monetary
stimulus as we now experience. The most important leg of the
GDP growth relay race lies dead ahead.
The
Winners Circle...One
suggestion for a final relationship to keep an eye on is the
following. This is the relationship between the Morgan
Stanley cyclical index and the MS consumer index. As is
clear, this has been a give and take battle over the last four
years with both sectors coming into and out of favor on almost a
scheduled basis. Almost like clockwork, this relationship
has bottomed during each October of the last three years and has
peaked during the third quarter in each of the last two. Do
the cyclicals once again peak relative to the consumer stocks
shortly ahead, or break out to a new multi-year high in terms of
this relationship?

We
believe the resolution ahead will be important on a number of
fronts. First, the invisible hand of the market will be
casting an important vote as to the potential for acceleration in
GDP growth moving forward. A message worthy of respect as we
continue to watch the character of the unfolding stimulus driven
economic strength. Secondly, a break out to
multi-year highs in the relationship between cyclical and consumer
stocks would be saying something about forward looking bond market
prospects. We find it more than interesting that at the
recent FOMC soiree, the Fed didn't even throw the bond market a
bone. Not even a scrap. This is two back-to-back Fed
conclaves where the bonds have sold off heavily post the meeting.
Almost a complete switch for experience during the infamous
Greenspan tenure. Who knows, maybe the keeper of the above
cyclical and consumer indices knows something. After all, it
was just a few weeks back that Morgan Stanley was "urging" their
clientele to purchase longer maturity fixed income vehicles.
If what you see above breaks out to a new high, that just might
not be such a good idea, will it?
|